New York Private Equity Lawyer & Attorney : Geoffrey Parnass : Corporate & Business Law

The private equity sponsors behind the Clear Chanel acquisition – Bain Capital and Thomas H. Lee Partners -- are looking at the possibility of paying a $500 million reverse termination fee to Clear Channel if they are forced to walk away for lack of bank financing. Maybe the sponsors can recover some of this from the lenders who promised to provide the financing – time will tell. The banks committed to provide about $16 billion of new debt, which they may struggle to sell given turmoil in the leveraged loan market.   And even if they do manage to sell it, they might face a mark-to-market hit of about $2.5 billion. Lawsuits recently begun in New York and Texas may clarify whether the banks are responsible for causing the deal to break.

The sponsors will have a hard time arguing that a material adverse change in Clear Channel’s fortunes has occurred, given that the company reported a 52 percent rise in fourth-quarter earnings. Assuming that some or all of the break-up fee has to be paid by the sponsors, who really has to foot that bill – the limited partners in the funds or Bain and THC?

An LBO partnership agreement typically provides that deal expenses, including “broken deal” costs, are paid by the investment partnership, namely, the limited partners. However, these costs are typically offset against the management fee paid by the fund to the sponsors. That provision makes the sponsor ultimately responsible for broken deal costs, but caps the exposure at the amount of the management fee. 

The impact of this situation can be seen in Blackstone’s recent 10K filing. There, in the MD&A section, Blackstone described certain shortfalls in management fee income that occurred during 2007. Prominent among the causes for this shortfall was a reverse termination fee that was paid when Blackstone terminated the acquisition of a subsidiary of PPH Corporation. Here is the relevant portion of Blackstone’s MD&A section:

"An increase in fund management fees of $47.2 million, as a result of $4.68 billion of additional capital raised for BCP V during the year ended December 31, 2007, was entirely offset by increased management fee reductions of $47.4 million. The increase in management fee reductions was due to increases of $38.2 million of broken deal expenses, which included a $24.2 million reverse termination fee incurred in connection with the termination of BCP V’s planned acquisition of a subsidiary of PHH Corporation, and $9.2 million of placement fees paid for additional capital raised by BCP V."

No wonder Bain and THL are suing the banks left and right.

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A recent spate of private equity cases has turned on the question whether the buyer has the right to walk away from a deal and pay a fixed price, known as the reverse termination fee.  Rather than be spurned, the target clutches at the specific performance clause in the merger agreement, and tries to push the deal through.  This year, so far, of the seven announced private equity deals for public companies, all have had reverse termination fees.  Moreover, each of the seven deals explicitly barred specific performance of the agreement.

As a result, private equity sponsors have the option to walk away from the deal for a fixed cancellation price.  In this environment, where guaranteed financing terms just aren't available, probably no other structure is possible for a leveraged deal.

 The recently announced deal to buy Getty Images, the pictures and video distributor, for $2.4 billion including debt, marks this trend.  The private equity firm, Heller & Friedman, rejected specific performance language and even added "no recourse" language directly in the merger agreement.  No recourse language typically states that the seller cannot directly sue the private equity firm for damages or specific performance. In Getty Images the merger agreement language states:

 
“[Getty Images] acknowledges and agrees that it has no right of recovery against, and no personal liability shall attach to, in each case with respect to [The Reverse Termination Fee Liability Limitation], any of the [Hellmann & Friedmann] Parties (other than [Acquisition] Parent to the extent provided in this Agreement and the Guarantor to the extent provided in the Limited Guarantee), through [Acquisition] Parent or otherwise, whether by or through attempted piercing of the corporate, limited partnership or limited liability company veil, by or through a claim by or on behalf of [Acquisition] Parent against the [Private Equity Fund] Guarantor or any other [Hellmann & Friedmann] Party, by the enforcement of any assessment or by any legal or equitable proceeding.”

It seems that parties have become disenchanted with the idea of specific performance as a remedy.  The courts have been reluctant to decree a merger, perhaps due to the significance of the remedy.  After all, how does one order the merger of two parties when one of them has changed its mind?  A merger requires willing parties on both sides to make things work.  Money, careers and even communities hang in the balance. The remedy itself seems unrealistic in the context of business combinations.

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The recent decision of the Delaware Court of Chancery in the case brought by United Rental against the acquisition vehicles formed by Cerberus Capital imposes an affirmative duty to be forthright, or not devious, in the process of contract negotiations. The ruling seems to undo decades, if not centuries, of negotiating wisdom and practice. 

The United Rental court was unable to dispose of the case on summary judgment, as the contract interpretations offered by both sides were plausible. Because no decision as a matter of law could be reached, the court had to delve into the real intention of the parties on the issue whether they intended to provide a specific performance remedy.

To do this, the court heard testimony from 7 witnesses over a 2 day period. United Rental had the burden of proof to show that the parties intended to allow the remedy of specific performance, rather than the $100 million termination payment offered by Cerberus.

After all this testimony, the court remained unable to determine the shared objective intent of the parties. It therefore proceeded to adopt the breathtaking “forthright negotiator” principle:

“in cases where an examination of the extrinsic evidence does not lead to an obvious, objectively reasonable conclusion, the Court may apply the forthright negotiator principle.  Under this principle, the Court considers the evidence of what one party subjectively “believed the obligation to be, coupled with evidence that the other party knew or should have known of such belief.” In other words, the forthright negotiator principle provides that, in cases where the extrinsic evidence does not lead to a single, commonly held understanding of a contract’s meaning, a court may consider the subjective understanding of one party that has been objectively manifested and is known or should be known by the other party.”

Calling the negotiations “deeply flawed”, because both sides “failed to clearly and consistently communicate their client’s positions”, the Court found that United Rental’s attorney “categorically failed to communicate that United Rental believed it preserved a right to specific performance”. The Cerberus attorney, on the other hand, did clearly communicate his understanding that the agreement precluded specific performance. Because the United Rental lawyer did not continue to repeat his view that the agreement provide for specific performance, and relied instead on the fact that the agreement contained inconsistent provisions, he failed to satisfy the “forthright negotiator” principle.

It may come as a shock to corporate attorneys that deviousness has been barred from contract negotiations. Yet that is law of Delaware:  “United Rental knew or should have known what Cerberus’s understanding of the Merger Agreement was, and if it disagreed with that understanding, it had an affirmative duty to clarify its position in the face of an ambiguous contract with glaringly conflicting provisions."

A duty indeed!

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As this website predicted on November 24th, the Delaware Court of Chancery on December 21, 2007 found that the sole and exclusive remedy of United Rental was the $100 million break up fee specifically provided for in the Merger Agreement with entities controlled by Cerberus Capital.

The exchange of drafts and the meetings between the parties indicated that the breakup fee was intended to preclude any other remedies, including specific performance..  United Rental’s case was based on the fact that the contract continued to have language providing for equitable remedies like specific performance, even though other sections said that this remedy was superseded by the breakup fee. In deposition, the Cerberus attorney conceded that it would have been “clearer” to delete the specific performance section altogether.

Given the relatively clear cap on exposure in the Merger Agreement, one would expect that the opinion of the Delaware court would stick closely to the express contract language and the law of summary judgment. In fact, most of the opinion does that. But the court ultimately relied on an interesting though obscure principle of contract interpretation called the “forthright negotiator principle.”

According to the court, under the forthright negotiator principle, “the subjective understanding of one party to a contract may bind the other party when the other party knows or has reason to know of that understanding. Because the evidence in this case shows that defendants [Cerberus] understood this Agreement to preclude the remedy of specific performance and that plaintiff [United Rental] knew or should have known of this understanding, I conclude that plaintiff has failed to meet its burden and find in favor of defendants.”

“The forthright negotiator principle provides that, in cases where the extrinsic evidence does not lead to a single, commonly held understanding of a contract’s meaning, a court may consider the subjective understanding of one party that has been objectively manifested and is known or should be known by the other party.”

The only support for this principle cited by the court was a section of the Restatement of Contracts. 

The very interesting history of these contract negotiations indicates that the parties never explicitly resolved the issue of whether the $100 million breakup fee was the sole and exclusive remedy. The court found that because the parties never clearly drafted any agreement on the termination fee, it would award judgment to the side that most clearly and consistently articulated its subjective understanding of the agreement to the other side. In this, the court found that the Cerberus attorney was more consistent in his statements that the termination fee was intended to preclude specific performance. The attorney for United Rental, the court found, implicitly agreed with the Cerberus position during oral contract negotiations.

The case came down to this fact: “Though URI, through [its lead attorney], had many opportunities throughout the negotiation process to clearly vocalize its understanding of its rights for specific performance under the Merger Agreement, URI consistently failed to communicate this to Cerberus representatives.”

The very interesting implications of this decision for the manner in which merger negotiations are conducted will be the subject of future postings here.

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Does Cerberus have the unilateral right to walk away from its deal with United Rental and limit its exposure to a break up fee of $100 million?  Or does United Rentals have the right to specifically enforce the merger agreement?  That's the issue at the heart of lawsuits currently pending in Delaware and New York arising out of this failed acquisition. 

Cerberus had this to say about United Rental's Delaware action for specific performance in a press release issued November 19th:

"We believe that United Rentals has been less than forthright in its legal filings and its communications concerning those filings.  The fact is that RAM negotiated for and obtained the right to withdraw from the Merger Agreement of July 22, 2007 and instead make a one-time payment in the aggregate amount of US $100 million.  This ability to walk away from the transaction with this limited exposure was specifically bargained for, is clearly and unambiguously stated in the Merger Agreement and related documentation, and is not in any way conditional on the occurrence of a material adverse change, the termination of the Merger Agreement by United Rentals or any other event."

Also, according to Bloomberg, Cerberus started its own lawsuit in New York Supreme Court seeking a declaration that its maximum exposure to United Rentals is $100 million. In the suit, Cerberus says United Rentals has no remedy other than the right to pursue the $100 million brake up fee, which serves as a cap for any or all losses or damages relating to or arising out of the merger agreement.

Let's see where that clear and unambiguous statement appears in the merger agreement.  Section 8.2(c) of the agreement says:

"In the event that this Agreement is terminated by [United Rentals] pursuant to Section 8.1(d)(i) or Section 8.1(d)(ii), then [Cerberus] shall pay $100,000,000 to [United Rentals] as promptly as reasonably practicable (and, in any event, within two business days following such termination), payable by wire transfer of same day funds."

OK then.  Section 8.1(d)(i) says that United Rental can terminate the agreement upon certain breaches by Cerberus of the merger agreement, and Section 8.1(d)(ii) says that United Rental can terminate the agreement if the merger isn't completed by a certain date.  Neither of these things has happened, and United Rentals isn't seeking the fee. 

Later on, in Section 8.2(e), there is a clause limiting liability for termination events to $100 million.  It says that United Rental's right to terminate the merger agreement under Sections 8.1(d)(i) or (ii) and receive the $100 million fee under Section 8.2(c) is the "sole and exclusive remedy" of United Rentals against Cerberus for "any and all loss or damage suffered as a result thereof" and Cerberus shall not have "any further liability or obligation of any kind or nature relating to or arising out of this Agreement or the transactions contemplated by this Agreement as a result of such termination."  This fee is "the sole and exclusive remedy for recovery" in the event of "the termination of this Agreement by [United Rentals] in compliance with the provisions of Section 8.1(d)(i) or (ii)."  

So far, it looks as though United Rentals has the winning position, as this language pretty clearly says that the $100 million payment is the sole remedy only in the situation where United Rentals has terminated the merger agreement due to a misrepresentation or failed deadline.  Up until now, there isn't any absolute cap on liability if Cerberus breaches the agreement and walks away.

But keep reading.  At the very end of Section 8.2(e), comes the provision that finally supports Cerberus:

"In no event, whether or not this Agreement has been terminated pursuant to any provision hereof, shall [Cerberus], either individually or in the aggregate, be subject to any liability in excess of [$100 million] for any or all losses or damages relating to or arising out of this Agreement or the transactions contemplated by this Agreement, including breaches by [Cerberus] of any representations, warranties, covenants or agreements contained in this Agreement, and in no event shall [United Rentals] seek equitable relief or seek to recover any money damages in excess of such amount from [Cerberus].

That's pretty clear.  Although there is plenty of language in the agreement that appears to support United Rentals' position, this one sentence appearing at the end of Section 8.2(e) seems to cap Cerberus' exposure at $100 million.   The stock market seems to agree as well.

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United Rentals Inc. recently sued the shell companies formed by Cerberus Capital Management to acquire the company after Cerberus informed it that it was not prepared to proceed with the $7 billion deal. Cerberus wants to cancel the deal because of trouble with financing. United Rentals is doing fine, having just reported a great quarter. The lawsuit raises an interesting issue on the interplay between the specific performance remedy and a liquidated damages provision providing for a $100 million payment in the event the merger agreement is canceled.

Cerberus and United Rental agreed to the deal in July 2007. The merger agreement has detailed provisions regarding financing. For example, it provides that if the Cerberus entities are not able to obtain financing from syndicated sources, it will draw down on a $4 billion of bridge financing commitments given by a group of lenders including Banc of America, Credit Suisse, Morgan Stanley and Lehman Brothers. As everyone knows, the syndication market for these deals has dried up, so people are looking at the bridge financing package.

Cerberus went along through the fall and the United Rental shareholder vote as though everything were fine. Several days ago, apparently reacting to pressure from the bridge lenders, it notified United Rental that it was not prepared to impair its relationship with the bridge lenders by forcing them to fund, even though the merger agreement required them to do so. Instead, it notified United Rental that it “elected not to consummate the transaction” and would pay a break-up fee of $100 million.

Cerberus or its advisers also leaked news of the potential breakup to the press and the stock dropped fast, erasing more than $1.2 billion of market cap.

The lawsuit is a study in the remedy of specific enforcement. United Rental wants to force the Cerberus entities to go through with the deal, and wants the Delaware Chancery Court to order Cerberus to draw down the bridge financing. Cerberus on the other hand acts as though it holds an option to buy the company which can be canceled by paying the $100 million break up fee. 

The break up fee section says the fee is due only if the merger agreement is terminated. Cerberus doesn’t seem to have the right to terminate the agreement. Cerberus is counting on the fact that specific performance is not a favorite judicial remedy, especially where the parties have contemplated a specific financial damages remedy, like a break up fee. But this agreement has all the makings of a good specific performance action. 

Right now, the market doesn’t think the chances of United Rentals are so good, as the stock price is substantially below the merger price.

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Deep within Blackstone's recent 10Q, in the MD&A section, the company discusses the negative impact that the "considerable turbulence" in the housing and sub-prime mortgage markets has had on other fixed income markets. 

"Deteriorating conditions in fixed income markets prevented lenders from syndicating senior loans and high yield debt."

Translation:  when the music stopped the the banks got stuck holding our last deals.

"[T]he backlog resulting from pending private equity-led transactions reached record levels."

Translation:  the banks can't get rid of the paper.

"This backlog resulted in lenders becoming less willing to fund new, large-sized acquisitions and as a consequence, the volume of new private equity acquisitions declined significantly in the quarter."

Translation:  until the pipeline gets opened we can't get the big dogs closed.

"Recently announced private equity-led acquisitions have mostly been smaller in size, with less leverage and less favorable terms for the debt provided, including more onerous loan covenants."

Translation:  looks like it's back to Plan A.

"The duration of current conditions in the credit markets is unknown."

No translation needed.

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Knowing how to get out of a deal is often as important as knowing how to get in.  When a company blows up, it's easy to find a representation that went awry.  But when things turn sour because of legislation or macro economic issues, you've got to look at the MAC clause.

The MAC, or material adverse change, clause sets the conditions under which a deal may be terminated without penalty. MAC exceptions, which are often appended to such clauses, outline specific circumstances under which the MAC doesn't apply, meaning the deal must proceed even if there is a material change.

During the deal frenzy of the past several years, sellers have had the upper hand in negotiating deal terms, a trend that has extended to the MAC clause. To win deals, buyers have agreed to loose MAC clauses with lots of exceptions, or in some cases have foregone MACs altogether.

The litigation currently pending in Delaware between SLM (Sallie Mae) and J.C. Flowers & Co. will, if it goes that far, shape the understanding of MAC clauses for the next few years.  J.C. Flowers and its partners have sought to walk away from the deal, in part on the basis that new Federal legislation will decrease the earning of the company.  SLM has of course insisted that the deal must go through, and issued a press release saying that "core earnings" at the company will be negatively impacted by only 1.8 to 2.1 percent annually over the next 5 years.  The issue is whether the MAC clause is triggered by the adverse impact of the new Federal legislation.  The clause reads as follows:

"Material Adverse Effect" means a material adverse effect on the financial condition, business, or results of operations of the Company and its Subsidiaries, taken as a whole, except to the extent any such effect results from: ... (b) changes in Applicable Law provided that, for purposes of this definition, "changes in Applicable Law" shall not include any changes in Applicable Law relating specifically to the education finance industry that are in the aggregate more adverse to the Company and its Subsidiaries, taken as a whole, than the legislative and budget proposals described under the heading "Recent Developments" in the Company 10-K, in each case in the form proposed publicly as of the date of the Company 10-K) or interpretations thereof by any Governmental Authority..."

As the highlighted language shows, SLM and JC Flowers were acutely aware of the potential impact of the new Federal legislation on the earnings of Sallie Mae.  This was not a thunderbolt from out of the blue.

SLM's position is that the "core earnings" of the company will only be reduced by 1.8 to 2.1 percent  MORE than what was already presented in the 10-K.  This sets the bar well under the 10% figure which most lawyers and judges would agree is "material".  As the M&A Law Prof Blog points out, the Delaware courts set a high bar for proving a MAC.  Under these cases the party asserting a MAC has the burden of proving that the adverse change will have long-term effects and must be materially significant.

Of course the issue may be settled before any trial.  Justine Strine has been pressing the sides to settle.  A renegotiated price is the likely outcome, as SLM will not likely want to remain in the public eye after this battle.

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 What do you call a guy who gives you a non-binding letter of intent to buy your company for $15.5 million, waits a few months before giving you another non-binding letter, and then sues you when you sign a binding contract to sell your company for $30.5 million?  In Nebraska, he’s called Kelly Conolly.

Conolly worked as a terminal manager for Clark Brothers Transfer, a trucking company based in Nebraska.  James Clark was the company's president and majority shareholder.  In early 2003, Conolly began talking with Clark about buying the company.  After months of negotiating, they executed a confidentiality agreement on October 17, 2003, which gave Conolly financial information about the company.  Clark asked Conolly to give him a written purchase offer in 2 weeks.  Conolly sent another non-binding letter of intent without a purchase offer.  The letter also left the purchase price open.

Clark and Conolly met the next day, orally agreed on a purchase price of $15.5 million, shook hands and left all the other terms open. Clark asked for a firm purchase offer within two weeks.  Six weeks later, Conolly's attorney sent a letter saying Conolly was interested in purchasing the company "pursuant to the terms contained in this non-binding letter of intent."  The letter named a price but reiterated that it was not a binding commitment by either party.  Conolly sent Clark an email stating, "of course this is just preliminary and a formal proposal will be forthcoming once we reach an agreement."  Six weeks later, Clark sold the company to another buyer for $30.5 million.

Conolly argued that the parties had a contract when they agreed on the price and shook hands.  The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that that the terms of the oral agreement were not “sufficiently definite to demonstrate an objective intent to be bound” at the time the parties shook hands.  The parties were still negotiating many basic terms. 

Wikipedia says that chutzpa is the quality of audacity, for good or for bad.  That may be the right word.

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Several recent deals illustrate the extent to which financial covenants have all but disappeared from senior loan agreements in private equity transactions. The following transactions were chosen at random.

• In the October 2005 acquisition of Neiman Marcus by Texas Pacific Group and Warburg Pincus, the $2 billion senior loan facility provided by Credit Suisse and Deutsche Bank Securities had no financial covenants. The agreement did have the usual negative covenants, but even these were significantly weakened. For example, the restriction on incurring other indebtedness had 23 exceptions.

• In the November 2005 acquisition of the Vitamin Shoppe by Bear Stearns Merchant Banking, the senior revolving loan facility provided by Wachovia Bank had one financial covenant. It said that if the availability on the revolver was nearly tapped out (less than 10% remaining) then during the four preceding quarters the Fixed Charge Coverage Ratio had to be at least 1.1 to 1.0, or barely enough to cover the charges.

• Finally, in the January 2006 acquisition of AMC Entertainment by J.P. Morgan Partners and Apollo Management from Bain Capital Partners, the $850 million senior credit facility provided by Citicorp had one financial covenant. This covenant provided that as long as the revolver remained outstanding, the company had to maintain a ratio of Senior Debt to EBITDA, on a pro forma basis (!), of at least 3.25 to 1.0.

These random selections from the credit agreements of large and mid-market deals illustrates the extent to which lenders have turned over the risk of defaults to the ultimate purchasers of the debt, namely, the CLO pools.

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The ratio of total debt to EBITDA in mid-market private equity transactions is now as high as it was in 1997 – 4.7 times for companies with less than $50 million in EBITDA and 5.4 times for companies with more than $50 million of EBITDA (Source: Standard and Poors). The ratio of EBITDA less CapEx to Cash Interest in highly leveraged loans is also falling – in the 4^th quarter of 2006 the ratio fell to 2.2 times (Source: Standard and Poors).

At the same time, the covenants being written for leveraged loans are becoming more “lite”: several years ago, loan covenants were written at a 15% discount to model; now they are being written at a 25% discount.

“Covenant-lite” transactions come in many forms. In their most direct form, the covenants that require the borrower to “maintain” certain financial ratios are eliminated altogether, and the lenders are left to rely only on covenants that restrict a company from “incurring” or actively engaging in certain action. For example, a covenant that requires a company to maintain a ratio of debt to EBITDA can be breached if the financial condition of the company deteriorates, as the covenant is measured periodically, usually quarterly. But a covenant that only restricts a company from incurring new debt cannot be violated simply by a deteriorating financial condition, the company has to take affirmative action to breach it. 

Less direct forms of “covenant-lite” include carve-outs in traditional maintenance covenants that forgive in advance a certain measure of deviation from the standard. It is sometime more palatable to embed these carve-outs in a traditional loan covenant than discard the covenant altogether.

In addition to covenant-lite structures, private-equity sponsored deals have started to include a greater number of “equity cure” provisions. These enable a borrower to cure a covenant deficiency by adding more equity into a deal to count as EBITDA, thereby curing the breach. The additional equity does not have to be used to pay down debt and can be used for different purposes such as capital expenditures. In effect, the private equity sponsor is pre-negotiating an equity infusion without having to get lender approval.

This trend is of course a function of the amazing amounts of liquidity available in the credit markets to fund acquisitions.  The impact of these covenant-lite transactions will be to retard the speed with which lenders will be able to take control over troubled deals.  That may not be such a bad thing.  Lenders are not equipped to own a business and typically sell too quickly when forced to take over a company.  The next downturn may provide less opportunity for distressed debt investors than previous business investment cycles, as fewer private equity sponsors may be handing over the keys to their lenders.  

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In a recent case from Delaware’s chancery court, the clear language in a merger agreement, controlling dispute resolution matters, was enforced by the court even where the method specified wasn’t the best way to resolve the dispute. The case underscores the importance of thinking carefully about the implications of arbitration clauses, and especially how two or more arbitration schemes relate to each other. 

Matria Healthcare entered into an agreement to acquire CorSolutions Medical for $445 million. Both companies were engaged in the disease management business. Nearly 5% of the purchase price ($20.3 million) was set aside in an escrow account to satisfy claims that the closing net working capital of CorSolutions fell short of a minimum target. The escrow account was also available to satisfy claims under the indemnification provisions, including breaches of representations and warranties.

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Fortress Investment Group LLC, one of the first private equity funds to go public, manages private equity funds with more than $17.5 billion in committed capital. The stock was priced at $18.50 on February 8, 2007 but quickly began trading at $31 per share on the first trading day. It has since tracked a steady decline and currently trades at $25 and change.

One of the private equity funds that Fortress manages provides debt and equity funding to other sponsors of private equity transactions. This fund finances small to mid-market transactions, deals with $5 million and more of EBITDA. Fortress provides “one stop financing” for these deals, lending all of the debt needed to finance the transaction and even part of the equity when necessary and attractive. The company likes to see a capital structure consisting of at least 40% of equity before it will finance the other 60%.

At a recent private equity conference, a representative of Fortress admitted that it was getting to be a struggle to find quality deals in the mid-market arena. One-stop financing has become the norm, and the field is seeing a good deal of competition on the lending side from hedge funds, mezzanine lenders and others. Sponsors are looking for and getting friendlier covenant and deal terms in order to maintain control of the company if a downturn in the economy should occur. The absence of good quality deals gives sponsors the ability to drive down interest rates and covenant protections.  At the same time, the amount of debt financing provided to sponsors is at peak multiples.

The pressure to continue putting funds to work is sure to lead to poor credit decisions by lenders.  Whether the gurus at Fortress will also fall to these temptations remains to be seen.

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