Shareholder Preemptive Rights: Common Terms of Subscription Privileges

Shareholders of closely held, privately owned companies often worry that their voting and economic rights may be diluted if the company were to issue new securities. An issuance of new securities could diminish a shareholder’s proportionate share of profits, dividends, and other distributions. These concerns may be especially acute when a company is just starting up and its owners anticipate future rounds of equity or debt financing. To prevent these undesirable consequences, shareholders may seek preemptive rights in offerings of new securities.  

Some states provide shareholders preemptive rights as a matter of law, while others require that preemptive rights be expressly granted in a company’s state filings or its organizational documents. Delaware’s general corporation law, for example, requires that preemptive rights be granted to shareholders in a company’s certificate of incorporation. Although there is some variance among state corporation laws, a company usually spells out the terms and conditions of any preemptive rights in its shareholders’ agreement.

Preemptive Rights: Determining a Shareholder’s Ownership Percentage

Preemptive rights entitle shareholders of a company to maintain their proportionate beneficial ownership interests by allowing them to participate in offerings of new securities on a pro rata basis. When a company issues new securities, each shareholder has a right to purchase a percentage of the new securities equal to the shareholder’s ownership percentage of the company’s outstanding stock prior to the offering. Each shareholder’s ownership percentage is calculated by dividing the number of the shareholder’s shares by the total outstanding shares of the company. One of the key differences among preemptive rights provisions is the way that the amount of total outstanding stock is determined. 

Preemptive rights may be offered either on an “as converted” or “as converted, fully diluted” basis. If the preemptive rights are offered on an “as converted” basis, then a company’s total outstanding stock prior to a new securities issuance includes both the total outstanding stock of the company and the outstanding stock there would be if its convertible preferred stock and convertible debt were to convert. If the preemptive rights are offered on an “as converted, fully diluted” basis, then a company’s total outstanding stock prior to a new securities issuance includes the company’s total outstanding stock on an “as converted basis,” plus the outstanding stock there would be if all options and warrants were exercised.

When a company plans to issue new securities that are subject to shareholders’ preemptive rights, the company commonly sends each shareholder a subscription warrant notifying him of the number of shares he is entitled to purchase.

Limitations on Preemptive Rights

Whether preemptive rights are offered on an “as converted” or “as converted, fully diluted” basis, they are customarily subject to certain limitations. Shareholder agreements restrict preemptive rights by excluding, or carving out, specific securities offerings from the definition of “new securities.” Securities offerings that may be carved out from the definition of new securities include those related to:

Equity Incentive Plans. Shareholders generally do not have preemptive rights in any new securities issued as part of a board approved employee equity incentive plan or other benefit program where the primary purpose is not to raise additional capital for the company. This exception allows the company’s board to incentivize management by offering them stock options and other interests in securities, while at the same time shielding the company from the prospect of a management buyout.  

Strategic Acquisitions. Where new securities are issued as consideration for the acquisition of another business entity, shareholders’ preemptive rights typically don’t apply. This exception enables the company to enter into transactions like stock-for-stock exchange mergers, or B reorganizations, in which an acquiring company issues new securities to the target company’s shareholders in return for a controlling interest in the target, and asset-for-stock exchange mergers, or C reorganizations, in which a company issues new securities to a target company’s shareholders in exchange for substantially all of the assets of the target. By affording the company an opportunity to grow through strategic acquisitions, this exception allows the company’s business operations to benefit from synergies and economies of scale and scope. 

Equity Kickers. So-called “equity kickers,” or equity interests attached to corporate debt, issued in connection with arm’s-length debt financing transactions are often excluded from a shareholder agreement’s definition of new securities. Banks may want to couple their rights as senior lenders with an equity position in the borrowing company and purchasers of corporate debt securities may prefer bonds issued with convertible features like options and warrants. In return, the issuing company receives lower interest rates on its senior and subordinated financing.

Stock Splits and Dividends. Another exception to the definition of new securities is the issuance of common stock resulting from a share dividend, share split, or similar event that is made on a pro rata basis. In shareholder agreements involving venture capitalists, this exception is generally not included. As primary capital contributors to a business, venture capitalists have considerable bargaining power and negotiate for additional anti-dilution protections by having their respective ownership percentages preserved after stock splits.

Public Offerings. Often, there is an exception for an initial public offering or listing of the company’s shares on a nationally or internationally recognized stock exchange. Usually, the exception only pertains to certain public offerings in which the new securities represent a specified percentage of the company’s total outstanding stock or raise proceeds above a defined threshold. The qualified public offering exception is commonly included in shareholder agreements among private equity firms when the sponsors anticipate a partial or total exit from their investment by means of an initial public offering.  

In practice, shareholder preemptive rights only benefit those shareholders with enough capital to participate in new securities offerings on a pro rata basis with their fellow investors. Shareholders with limited cash reserves may find themselves unable to exercise their preemptive rights in qualified offerings of new securities and consequently discover that their voting and economic rights have been diluted. 

You Say You Want a Dissolution? Minority Investor Issues in Delaware LLCs

A recent opinion issued by the Delaware Court of Chancery serves as a cautionary tale to entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, and others entering into LLC operating agreements in connection with start-up companies. A minority investor with a substantial stake in a company sought to dissolve the company on the grounds it had abandoned its original business plan. However, because the purposes of the LLC were worded quite broadly in the operating agreement, the court ruled against the dissolution, much to the frustration of the minority investor. Thanks go to Francis Pileggi for bringing the case of In re: Arrow Investment Advisors, LLC to my attention and providing, as usual, an excellent summary and analysis of the court’s opinion on his blog. 

 Along with two others, Noah Hamman co-founded Arrow Investment with the intention of offering advisory services to investment funds. Hamman, who held a 30% membership interest in the company, had been its CEO until he was removed by his two fellow founders as a result of disagreements over management decisions. Like many other financial services firms, Arrow’s prospects began to sink with the market’s. In response, Arrow’s management committee decided to explore other investment opportunities and sent out a notice to the company’s members requesting capital contributions to fund their new programs. Hamman disagreed with this approach and brought a petition before the Court of Chancery seeking dissolution of the LLC under §18-208 of the Delaware LLC Act, alleging that Arrow had departed from the business strategy set out in its original business plan.  

 The court noted that Arrow’s LLC operating agreement, and not its business plan, was the controlling document for determining the company’s purpose. Arrow’s operating agreement clearly stated it was formed “for the purpose of acting as an investment adviser to certain investment funds and for such other lawful business as the Management Committee chooses to pursue.” Given the broad formation clause of the operating agreement, the court ruled that Arrow’s management had not violated the purpose for which the company had been formed simply by choosing to pursue new business strategies. In the words of Vice Chancellor Strine:

Dissolution of an entity chartered for a broad business purpose remains possible upon a strong showing that a confluence of situationally specific adverse financial, market, product, managerial, or corporate governance circumstances make it nihilistic for the entity to continue. 

A company suffering disappointing financial returns resulting from a downturn in general economic conditions did not meet this standard.    

For most companies, including a broad purpose of formation clause in the operating agreement makes sense because it provides management with flexibility to adapt to changing business conditions. But founders of start-up companies should accept that the company’s eventual trajectory may not follow the one they initially conceived. 

To address this unknown and unknowable future, LLC operating agreements can institute appropriate governance procedures and potential exit provisions that would allow management and the company’s members to resolve significant disputes, or, if necessary, to part ways. Members of LLCs with substantial minority stakes, for example, may be given veto rights over certain material managerial decisions (such as when capital calls may be made to fund new business ventures) or exit rights that would allow a withdrawal from the LLC under narrowly specified conditions.        

Nobody won in the case of Arrow Investment Advisors. Hamman remains bound to a company he no longer wants to be a part of, management must continue to deal with a contrary minority investor, and the LLC itself has lost valuable time and money in defending this lawsuit.