High-Yield Debt Issuers Trigger "PIK" Options

In the face of depressed earnings and a weak economy, a raft of cash-strapped private equity portfolio companies have stopped making cash interest payments to holders of their high-yield debt, electing instead to issue additional notes by triggering an option known as a payment-in-kind, or “PIK,” toggle. In February, Forbes Magazine reported that in recent months 23 companies had exercised PIK options on their high-yield debt.

Under the terms of a PIK-toggle notes indenture, an issuer can choose to pay accrued interest on its notes either in cash or by issuing additional notes, known as “PIK notes.” When an issuer chooses to pay interest in PIK notes, the annual interest rate for the notes usually increases by about 25 to 75 basis points. Generally, interest payments in PIK notes are reflected by increasing the outstanding principal amount of notes held by an investor in an amount equal to the PIK interest that accrued over the relevant interest period. Since PIK note interest payments are added to the principal amount of the outstanding notes, PIK interest – unlike cash interest – is compounded. At maturity, the issuer must pay its noteholders the total adjusted outstanding principal amount of the notes – including capitalized PIK interest – in cash.

During the private equity boom of 2005-2007, firms successfully negotiated senior and subordinated financing with strikingly permissive terms. Many senior bank loans, for example, were stripped of traditional covenants requiring borrowers to maintain certain financial ratios (such as Total Debt to EBITDA). The lenient terms on which banks were willing to fund senior loans, colloquially referred to as “covenant lite,” protected debt issuers from activating automatic default provisions merely by a deteriorating financial condition. 

At the same time, investment banks discovered that investors’ appetite for high-yield corporate debt allowed them to underwrite notes offerings on more issuer friendly terms. Investors, it turned out, were willing to provide debt issuers flexibility in how they chose to make interest payments in exchange for increased returns. Adding a PIK toggle feature to standard high-yield notes indentures appealed to investors and private equity sponsors alike. Investors purchased PIK-toggle notes primarily because they offered an overall higher rate of return on a high-risk investment. Private equity sponsors negotiated PIK toggle options because it gave them a cash alternative to servicing at least some of their portfolio companies’ debt. Sponsors thought PIK toggle options would help protect their equity investment from economic downturns by reducing a portfolio company’s need for cash when restricted by liquidity constraints. PIK notes became so popular that by November 2008 around 47 companies, most owned by private equity firms, had amassed a total of $33.4 billion in outstanding PIK notes

For sponsors of highly leveraged portfolio companies that require consistently high earnings in order to service their substantial debt obligations, PIK toggles were a creative way to mitigate a high-yield debt issuer’s risk of missing interest payments in the event that revenues declined. Indeed, PIK-toggle notes function like “interest lite” debt that allows companies to defer interest payments without incurring penalties, defaulting under the notes indenture, or breaching cross-default provisions in other financing documents. But the flexibility in financing provided by PIK notes came at a price: Moody’s Investors Service concluded that issuers of PIK-toggle notes in the years 2005 through 2007 typically paid 75 basis points more on their issued debt and received weaker corporate credit ratings than non-PIK notes issuers. 

Exercising their rights under PIK toggle options to suspend cash interest payments can help high-yield debt issuers reduce the costs of servicing their debt in the short-term, but this financing strategy does not address highly leveraged companies’ long-term debt servicing needs. Most PIK-toggle notes indentures only permit issuers to make PIK interest payments for a limited time (usually five years), after which they are required to make cash interest payments. Companies that currently pay PIK interest to their bondholders and whose PIK toggle options expire in the next 12 to 18 months will be most vulnerable to defaulting on their debt if current economic conditions continue. Unless such companies can begin to improve operating results significantly, they may find it prohibitively difficult to resume quarterly cash interest payments.

Blackstone on Current Conditions

Deep within Blackstone's recent 10Q, in the MD&A section, the company discusses the negative impact that the "considerable turbulence" in the housing and sub-prime mortgage markets has had on other fixed income markets. 

"Deteriorating conditions in fixed income markets prevented lenders from syndicating senior loans and high yield debt."

Translation:  when the music stopped the the banks got stuck holding our last deals.

"[T]he backlog resulting from pending private equity-led transactions reached record levels."

Translation:  the banks can't get rid of the paper.

"This backlog resulted in lenders becoming less willing to fund new, large-sized acquisitions and as a consequence, the volume of new private equity acquisitions declined significantly in the quarter."

Translation:  until the pipeline gets opened we can't get the big dogs closed.

"Recently announced private equity-led acquisitions have mostly been smaller in size, with less leverage and less favorable terms for the debt provided, including more onerous loan covenants."

Translation:  looks like it's back to Plan A.

"The duration of current conditions in the credit markets is unknown."

No translation needed.

Structural Subordination -- Dude, What Happened to My Collateral?

Freescale Semiconductor  was acquired by Blackstone Group, Carlyle Group, Permira Advisers LLC, and TPG Capital LLC in late 2006.  A recent article by Henny Sender in the Wall Street Journal discussed how this consortium convinced its banks and other lenders to accept an especially lenient package of covenants and interest payment options.  A review of Freescale's public filings since the deal closed reveals just how lenient the package is.

Believe it or not, due to the way the deal is structured, the trade creditors in 72% of Freescale's business are functionally senior to all of the $9.5 billion that was borrowed to finance the acquisition.  The $9.5 billion is "structurally subordinated" to these trade creditors, because the borrower of these funds is the parent company and the trade creditors deal with subsidiaries that did not guarantee the parent's debt.  Pretty neat trick.

Here is one of the Risk Factors in Freescale's Form S-4, filed on March 8, 2007 in connection with a bond exchange offer:

Claims of holders of the Exchange Notes will be structurally subordinated to the claims of creditors of our subsidiaries that do not guarantee the Exchange Notes, including trade creditors. All obligations of these subsidiaries will have to be satisfied before any of the assets of such subsidiaries would be available for distribution, upon a liquidation or otherwise, to us or creditors of us, including the holders of the Exchange Notes.

In a separate section of the S-4 we learn who these lucky trade creditors are and the magnitude of the structural subordination:

Our non-guarantor subsidiaries accounted for approximately $4,594 million, or 72% of our net sales, and approximately $635 million of our EBITDA for the year ended December 31, 2006.

There's more.  Not only is the unsecured high-yield debt in this boat, but the secured debt is too!  Information about the secured debt is a little hard to find in the filing, which is an exchange offer for the unsecured notes.  But here it is:

As of the issue date, none of our subsidiaries will guarantee the Exchange Notes or the new senior secured credit facilities.

In other words, all $9.5 billion of the debt, secured and unsecured, sits at the parent company with 28% of the revenues.  The other 72% of the revenues run through various subsidiaries, none of which has guaranteed even the senior debt.  On top of that, the filing discloses that Freescale is allowed to incur an additional $1 billion of new debt, draw on a $750 million revolved and pay some of the bonds in PIK notes.  With the bulk of its trade creditors protected and plenty of excess capital, it's hard to imaging how this boat could ever go down.

Apologies to Polonius, but what a great time it is a borrower to be.

"I can't think of the last time we had a real covenant"

This is from an article in the Boston Globe quoting Scott Sperling and Kevin Landry of TA Associates:

"The reality is the markets are willing to provide extraordinary amounts of debt, almost indiscriminately," says Scott Sperling , copresident of Thomas H. Lee Partners, the big Boston private equity firm. "It's hard to put these companies into default. I can't think of the last time we had a real covenant in one of our deals."

Landry told me about the terms TA Associates secured recently to fund the purchase of a company. In particular, the interest rate was set at 2.25 percent over the floating London Interbank Offered Rate, or LIBOR. But TA Associates doesn't have to make all its payments in cash if the acquired company runs into trouble. It can make something known as a toggle payment, or "payment in kind," essentially borrowing more to make the regularly scheduled loan payment. The only penalty: an interest rate that rises 0.5 percent."

Covenants are a thing of the past.  The toggle payment, payment-in-kind and similar default-avoidance provisions, make even failures to pay interest a non-event. 

You could argue that what the lenders are doing is pre-agreeing to terms of a default work-out program.  They are saying, "we like the horse we rode in on, and are willing to give them time to get back on track when problems arise."  It is a show of faith in the ability of the PE sponsors to work out any problems or ride out short term economic issues.

Is it a bad idea for lenders to be handing over traditional lending rights to PE sponsors?  Maybe.  But is the cost and outcome of bankruptcy any better?

Second Lien Financing

Credit continues to be readily available for buyouts of all sizes at attractive terms.  One notable features of leveraged acquisition financing in the past few years has been the growth of “second lien” debt financing in place of traditional “high yield” debt financing.

As the name suggests, the providers of second-lien financing get a security interest in the underlying collateral, but it is ranked second to the senior debt. Specifically, the second-lien lender agrees to subordinate its security interest to the rights of the senior lender. Over time, as the senor term debt is repaid, the second-lien financing achieves a higher position in the capital structure, as it remains senior to trade and other unsecured debt. Under the Bankruptcy Code, holders of second-lien debt will have priority over unsecured creditors, the right to adequate protection, the right to post-petition interest, and the right to object to sales of collateral unless they are paid in full from the proceeds of sale.

The growth and popularity of second-lien financing has nearly eclipsed traditional high yield financing, especially in large transactions. But even in the mid-tier arena, second-lien financing is making rapid inroads on traditional high yield financing. The difference in pricing between second-lien and high yield financing can be 200 to 300 basis points. Whether the second-lien position is adequate compensation for this reduced interest will be discovered when the next round of defaults and workouts hits the private equity markets.  

In many ways, second lien financing is a product of the collateralized loan obligation market. CLOs are pools of capital that invest in collateralized loan obligations. The vast amount of cash that has poured into CLOs in recent years has increased the availability of financing structured as second-lien debt.