New York Private Equity Lawyer & Attorney : Geoffrey Parnass : Corporate & Business Law

The most recent issue of the Debevoise & Plimpton Private Equity Report notes that, at the current time, there are more than 50 private equity transactions in North America with an aggregate transaction value of more than $60 billion waiting to get done. Each of these deals was signed up prior to the current credit crunch.  It remains to be seen how or whether these transactions will get done, and it so on what terms. Separately, it remains open how the current macro economic conditions will impact private equity deals going forward.

The issue also contains an interesting discussion of the Forthright Negotiator doctrine, which this blog has discussed before.  Ambiguity can often be found, or manufactured, during the course of litigation.  The United Rentals case stands for the proposition that what is communicated in negotiating sessions, sidebars and email exchanges, whether involving lawyers, bankers or clients, can carry great weight in shaping a court’s understanding of a disputed contract.  Look for more emails reiterating the parties' intentions, even in the face of contract language that is clear.

• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks

A recent spate of private equity cases has turned on the question whether the buyer has the right to walk away from a deal and pay a fixed price, known as the reverse termination fee.  Rather than be spurned, the target clutches at the specific performance clause in the merger agreement, and tries to push the deal through.  This year, so far, of the seven announced private equity deals for public companies, all have had reverse termination fees.  Moreover, each of the seven deals explicitly barred specific performance of the agreement.

As a result, private equity sponsors have the option to walk away from the deal for a fixed cancellation price.  In this environment, where guaranteed financing terms just aren't available, probably no other structure is possible for a leveraged deal.

 The recently announced deal to buy Getty Images, the pictures and video distributor, for $2.4 billion including debt, marks this trend.  The private equity firm, Heller & Friedman, rejected specific performance language and even added "no recourse" language directly in the merger agreement.  No recourse language typically states that the seller cannot directly sue the private equity firm for damages or specific performance. In Getty Images the merger agreement language states:

 
“[Getty Images] acknowledges and agrees that it has no right of recovery against, and no personal liability shall attach to, in each case with respect to [The Reverse Termination Fee Liability Limitation], any of the [Hellmann & Friedmann] Parties (other than [Acquisition] Parent to the extent provided in this Agreement and the Guarantor to the extent provided in the Limited Guarantee), through [Acquisition] Parent or otherwise, whether by or through attempted piercing of the corporate, limited partnership or limited liability company veil, by or through a claim by or on behalf of [Acquisition] Parent against the [Private Equity Fund] Guarantor or any other [Hellmann & Friedmann] Party, by the enforcement of any assessment or by any legal or equitable proceeding.”

It seems that parties have become disenchanted with the idea of specific performance as a remedy.  The courts have been reluctant to decree a merger, perhaps due to the significance of the remedy.  After all, how does one order the merger of two parties when one of them has changed its mind?  A merger requires willing parties on both sides to make things work.  Money, careers and even communities hang in the balance. The remedy itself seems unrealistic in the context of business combinations.

• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks

The recent decision of the Delaware Court of Chancery in the case brought by United Rental against the acquisition vehicles formed by Cerberus Capital imposes an affirmative duty to be forthright, or not devious, in the process of contract negotiations. The ruling seems to undo decades, if not centuries, of negotiating wisdom and practice. 

The United Rental court was unable to dispose of the case on summary judgment, as the contract interpretations offered by both sides were plausible. Because no decision as a matter of law could be reached, the court had to delve into the real intention of the parties on the issue whether they intended to provide a specific performance remedy.

To do this, the court heard testimony from 7 witnesses over a 2 day period. United Rental had the burden of proof to show that the parties intended to allow the remedy of specific performance, rather than the $100 million termination payment offered by Cerberus.

After all this testimony, the court remained unable to determine the shared objective intent of the parties. It therefore proceeded to adopt the breathtaking “forthright negotiator” principle:

“in cases where an examination of the extrinsic evidence does not lead to an obvious, objectively reasonable conclusion, the Court may apply the forthright negotiator principle.  Under this principle, the Court considers the evidence of what one party subjectively “believed the obligation to be, coupled with evidence that the other party knew or should have known of such belief.” In other words, the forthright negotiator principle provides that, in cases where the extrinsic evidence does not lead to a single, commonly held understanding of a contract’s meaning, a court may consider the subjective understanding of one party that has been objectively manifested and is known or should be known by the other party.”

Calling the negotiations “deeply flawed”, because both sides “failed to clearly and consistently communicate their client’s positions”, the Court found that United Rental’s attorney “categorically failed to communicate that United Rental believed it preserved a right to specific performance”. The Cerberus attorney, on the other hand, did clearly communicate his understanding that the agreement precluded specific performance. Because the United Rental lawyer did not continue to repeat his view that the agreement provide for specific performance, and relied instead on the fact that the agreement contained inconsistent provisions, he failed to satisfy the “forthright negotiator” principle.

It may come as a shock to corporate attorneys that deviousness has been barred from contract negotiations. Yet that is law of Delaware:  “United Rental knew or should have known what Cerberus’s understanding of the Merger Agreement was, and if it disagreed with that understanding, it had an affirmative duty to clarify its position in the face of an ambiguous contract with glaringly conflicting provisions."

A duty indeed!

• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks

As this website predicted on November 24th, the Delaware Court of Chancery on December 21, 2007 found that the sole and exclusive remedy of United Rental was the $100 million break up fee specifically provided for in the Merger Agreement with entities controlled by Cerberus Capital.

The exchange of drafts and the meetings between the parties indicated that the breakup fee was intended to preclude any other remedies, including specific performance..  United Rental’s case was based on the fact that the contract continued to have language providing for equitable remedies like specific performance, even though other sections said that this remedy was superseded by the breakup fee. In deposition, the Cerberus attorney conceded that it would have been “clearer” to delete the specific performance section altogether.

Given the relatively clear cap on exposure in the Merger Agreement, one would expect that the opinion of the Delaware court would stick closely to the express contract language and the law of summary judgment. In fact, most of the opinion does that. But the court ultimately relied on an interesting though obscure principle of contract interpretation called the “forthright negotiator principle.”

According to the court, under the forthright negotiator principle, “the subjective understanding of one party to a contract may bind the other party when the other party knows or has reason to know of that understanding. Because the evidence in this case shows that defendants [Cerberus] understood this Agreement to preclude the remedy of specific performance and that plaintiff [United Rental] knew or should have known of this understanding, I conclude that plaintiff has failed to meet its burden and find in favor of defendants.”

“The forthright negotiator principle provides that, in cases where the extrinsic evidence does not lead to a single, commonly held understanding of a contract’s meaning, a court may consider the subjective understanding of one party that has been objectively manifested and is known or should be known by the other party.”

The only support for this principle cited by the court was a section of the Restatement of Contracts. 

The very interesting history of these contract negotiations indicates that the parties never explicitly resolved the issue of whether the $100 million breakup fee was the sole and exclusive remedy. The court found that because the parties never clearly drafted any agreement on the termination fee, it would award judgment to the side that most clearly and consistently articulated its subjective understanding of the agreement to the other side. In this, the court found that the Cerberus attorney was more consistent in his statements that the termination fee was intended to preclude specific performance. The attorney for United Rental, the court found, implicitly agreed with the Cerberus position during oral contract negotiations.

The case came down to this fact: “Though URI, through [its lead attorney], had many opportunities throughout the negotiation process to clearly vocalize its understanding of its rights for specific performance under the Merger Agreement, URI consistently failed to communicate this to Cerberus representatives.”

The very interesting implications of this decision for the manner in which merger negotiations are conducted will be the subject of future postings here.

• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks (1)

Does Cerberus have the unilateral right to walk away from its deal with United Rental and limit its exposure to a break up fee of $100 million?  Or does United Rentals have the right to specifically enforce the merger agreement?  That's the issue at the heart of lawsuits currently pending in Delaware and New York arising out of this failed acquisition. 

Cerberus had this to say about United Rental's Delaware action for specific performance in a press release issued November 19th:

"We believe that United Rentals has been less than forthright in its legal filings and its communications concerning those filings.  The fact is that RAM negotiated for and obtained the right to withdraw from the Merger Agreement of July 22, 2007 and instead make a one-time payment in the aggregate amount of US $100 million.  This ability to walk away from the transaction with this limited exposure was specifically bargained for, is clearly and unambiguously stated in the Merger Agreement and related documentation, and is not in any way conditional on the occurrence of a material adverse change, the termination of the Merger Agreement by United Rentals or any other event."

Also, according to Bloomberg, Cerberus started its own lawsuit in New York Supreme Court seeking a declaration that its maximum exposure to United Rentals is $100 million. In the suit, Cerberus says United Rentals has no remedy other than the right to pursue the $100 million brake up fee, which serves as a cap for any or all losses or damages relating to or arising out of the merger agreement.

Let's see where that clear and unambiguous statement appears in the merger agreement.  Section 8.2(c) of the agreement says:

"In the event that this Agreement is terminated by [United Rentals] pursuant to Section 8.1(d)(i) or Section 8.1(d)(ii), then [Cerberus] shall pay $100,000,000 to [United Rentals] as promptly as reasonably practicable (and, in any event, within two business days following such termination), payable by wire transfer of same day funds."

OK then.  Section 8.1(d)(i) says that United Rental can terminate the agreement upon certain breaches by Cerberus of the merger agreement, and Section 8.1(d)(ii) says that United Rental can terminate the agreement if the merger isn't completed by a certain date.  Neither of these things has happened, and United Rentals isn't seeking the fee. 

Later on, in Section 8.2(e), there is a clause limiting liability for termination events to $100 million.  It says that United Rental's right to terminate the merger agreement under Sections 8.1(d)(i) or (ii) and receive the $100 million fee under Section 8.2(c) is the "sole and exclusive remedy" of United Rentals against Cerberus for "any and all loss or damage suffered as a result thereof" and Cerberus shall not have "any further liability or obligation of any kind or nature relating to or arising out of this Agreement or the transactions contemplated by this Agreement as a result of such termination."  This fee is "the sole and exclusive remedy for recovery" in the event of "the termination of this Agreement by [United Rentals] in compliance with the provisions of Section 8.1(d)(i) or (ii)."  

So far, it looks as though United Rentals has the winning position, as this language pretty clearly says that the $100 million payment is the sole remedy only in the situation where United Rentals has terminated the merger agreement due to a misrepresentation or failed deadline.  Up until now, there isn't any absolute cap on liability if Cerberus breaches the agreement and walks away.

But keep reading.  At the very end of Section 8.2(e), comes the provision that finally supports Cerberus:

"In no event, whether or not this Agreement has been terminated pursuant to any provision hereof, shall [Cerberus], either individually or in the aggregate, be subject to any liability in excess of [$100 million] for any or all losses or damages relating to or arising out of this Agreement or the transactions contemplated by this Agreement, including breaches by [Cerberus] of any representations, warranties, covenants or agreements contained in this Agreement, and in no event shall [United Rentals] seek equitable relief or seek to recover any money damages in excess of such amount from [Cerberus].

That's pretty clear.  Although there is plenty of language in the agreement that appears to support United Rentals' position, this one sentence appearing at the end of Section 8.2(e) seems to cap Cerberus' exposure at $100 million.   The stock market seems to agree as well.

• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks

United Rentals Inc. recently sued the shell companies formed by Cerberus Capital Management to acquire the company after Cerberus informed it that it was not prepared to proceed with the $7 billion deal. Cerberus wants to cancel the deal because of trouble with financing. United Rentals is doing fine, having just reported a great quarter. The lawsuit raises an interesting issue on the interplay between the specific performance remedy and a liquidated damages provision providing for a $100 million payment in the event the merger agreement is canceled.

Cerberus and United Rental agreed to the deal in July 2007. The merger agreement has detailed provisions regarding financing. For example, it provides that if the Cerberus entities are not able to obtain financing from syndicated sources, it will draw down on a $4 billion of bridge financing commitments given by a group of lenders including Banc of America, Credit Suisse, Morgan Stanley and Lehman Brothers. As everyone knows, the syndication market for these deals has dried up, so people are looking at the bridge financing package.

Cerberus went along through the fall and the United Rental shareholder vote as though everything were fine. Several days ago, apparently reacting to pressure from the bridge lenders, it notified United Rental that it was not prepared to impair its relationship with the bridge lenders by forcing them to fund, even though the merger agreement required them to do so. Instead, it notified United Rental that it “elected not to consummate the transaction” and would pay a break-up fee of $100 million.

Cerberus or its advisers also leaked news of the potential breakup to the press and the stock dropped fast, erasing more than $1.2 billion of market cap.

The lawsuit is a study in the remedy of specific enforcement. United Rental wants to force the Cerberus entities to go through with the deal, and wants the Delaware Chancery Court to order Cerberus to draw down the bridge financing. Cerberus on the other hand acts as though it holds an option to buy the company which can be canceled by paying the $100 million break up fee. 

The break up fee section says the fee is due only if the merger agreement is terminated. Cerberus doesn’t seem to have the right to terminate the agreement. Cerberus is counting on the fact that specific performance is not a favorite judicial remedy, especially where the parties have contemplated a specific financial damages remedy, like a break up fee. But this agreement has all the makings of a good specific performance action. 

Right now, the market doesn’t think the chances of United Rentals are so good, as the stock price is substantially below the merger price.

• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks

Deep within Blackstone's recent 10Q, in the MD&A section, the company discusses the negative impact that the "considerable turbulence" in the housing and sub-prime mortgage markets has had on other fixed income markets. 

"Deteriorating conditions in fixed income markets prevented lenders from syndicating senior loans and high yield debt."

Translation:  when the music stopped the the banks got stuck holding our last deals.

"[T]he backlog resulting from pending private equity-led transactions reached record levels."

Translation:  the banks can't get rid of the paper.

"This backlog resulted in lenders becoming less willing to fund new, large-sized acquisitions and as a consequence, the volume of new private equity acquisitions declined significantly in the quarter."

Translation:  until the pipeline gets opened we can't get the big dogs closed.

"Recently announced private equity-led acquisitions have mostly been smaller in size, with less leverage and less favorable terms for the debt provided, including more onerous loan covenants."

Translation:  looks like it's back to Plan A.

"The duration of current conditions in the credit markets is unknown."

No translation needed.

• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks

Judge Christopher A. Boyko's order dismissing a number of foreclosure actions brought by a CDO trustee throws a hard light on a common practice in real estate loan syndication.  Due to the cost of  properly assigning the notes and mortgages that get tossed into the CDO trust, the assignments are not actually completed.  Instead, documents are signed expressing an "intent" to assign.  A spokesman for Deutsche Bank, the CDO trustee, said that skipping the assignment process :

"[Is] typically done as a matter of cost efficiency, since for some extremely high percentage of mortgages there will never be any foreclosure activity, there's no legal need for the assignments to be recorded until they need to be used." 

Because the assignments were not completed at the time the foreclosure actions were filed, Judge Boyko ruled that the CDO trustee lacked standing to bring the action.  A dismissal on these grounds is not based on the merits, and the trustee is free to refile the action once it completes the assignment paperwork.

Assuming, of course, that paperwork exists and can be found.  The paperwork underlying a large CDO is massive.  The notes and mortgages on which the CDO is based are originated in broker's and lawyer's offices around the country, and a book entry is made somewhere reflecting the loan.  That book entry is what is placed in the CDO trust, not the note and mortgage itself. 

Deutsche Bank tried the compelling argument that “‘Judge, you just don’t understand how things work.’”  That didn't go down well with Judge Boyko, who wrote that this attitude “reveals a condescending mindset and quasi-monopolistic system where financial institutions have traditionally controlled, and still control, the foreclosure process.”

The balance of power in the foreclosure process may tip toward plaintiff's attorneys if other courts begin demanding proper documentation of syndicated loans.

• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks

Knowing how to get out of a deal is often as important as knowing how to get in.  When a company blows up, it's easy to find a representation that went awry.  But when things turn sour because of legislation or macro economic issues, you've got to look at the MAC clause.

The MAC, or material adverse change, clause sets the conditions under which a deal may be terminated without penalty. MAC exceptions, which are often appended to such clauses, outline specific circumstances under which the MAC doesn't apply, meaning the deal must proceed even if there is a material change.

During the deal frenzy of the past several years, sellers have had the upper hand in negotiating deal terms, a trend that has extended to the MAC clause. To win deals, buyers have agreed to loose MAC clauses with lots of exceptions, or in some cases have foregone MACs altogether.

The litigation currently pending in Delaware between SLM (Sallie Mae) and J.C. Flowers & Co. will, if it goes that far, shape the understanding of MAC clauses for the next few years.  J.C. Flowers and its partners have sought to walk away from the deal, in part on the basis that new Federal legislation will decrease the earning of the company.  SLM has of course insisted that the deal must go through, and issued a press release saying that "core earnings" at the company will be negatively impacted by only 1.8 to 2.1 percent annually over the next 5 years.  The issue is whether the MAC clause is triggered by the adverse impact of the new Federal legislation.  The clause reads as follows:

"Material Adverse Effect" means a material adverse effect on the financial condition, business, or results of operations of the Company and its Subsidiaries, taken as a whole, except to the extent any such effect results from: ... (b) changes in Applicable Law provided that, for purposes of this definition, "changes in Applicable Law" shall not include any changes in Applicable Law relating specifically to the education finance industry that are in the aggregate more adverse to the Company and its Subsidiaries, taken as a whole, than the legislative and budget proposals described under the heading "Recent Developments" in the Company 10-K, in each case in the form proposed publicly as of the date of the Company 10-K) or interpretations thereof by any Governmental Authority..."

As the highlighted language shows, SLM and JC Flowers were acutely aware of the potential impact of the new Federal legislation on the earnings of Sallie Mae.  This was not a thunderbolt from out of the blue.

SLM's position is that the "core earnings" of the company will only be reduced by 1.8 to 2.1 percent  MORE than what was already presented in the 10-K.  This sets the bar well under the 10% figure which most lawyers and judges would agree is "material".  As the M&A Law Prof Blog points out, the Delaware courts set a high bar for proving a MAC.  Under these cases the party asserting a MAC has the burden of proving that the adverse change will have long-term effects and must be materially significant.

Of course the issue may be settled before any trial.  Justine Strine has been pressing the sides to settle.  A renegotiated price is the likely outcome, as SLM will not likely want to remain in the public eye after this battle.

• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks